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 In 1959, C.P. Snow claimed that contemporary society had become 
divided into two distinct cultures – the arts and sciences – and showed how 
this academic divide was connected to a real world economic split between 
the haves and have-nots.  Today, the division is more often between science 
and politics, creating a rift between empirical fact and public policy.  When 
facing global challenges such as resource depletion, dwindling biodiversity, 
escalating populations, and increased CO2 levels, should popular opinion be 
allowed to trump empirical data?  Or should policy makers be forced to rule 
along scientific guidelines?  And is there a danger of losing civil liberties to 
the dictates of scientifically-run government bodies? Throughout human 
history we have struggled with the distinction between “is” and “ought”: 
whether facts should (or even can) determine values.  In communities of 
open inquiry, we must also consider the relation between education and 
social order: whether to require that citizens be educated in the sciences in 
order to vote on matters of public concern, or to allow the will of an 
uninformed populace to take precedence over matters of sheer fact.  
Genuinely democratic society requires an educated public, but raises 
questions of intellectual freedom: what should we teach?  The global society 
of the 21st Century will face this issue in a variety of ways.  If our differences 
matter less than our commonality – and even threaten it – nothing may 
matter more than that our public policies reflect our collective scientific 
understanding.  So, a world-wide community must entail increased focus on 
education. 
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 In 1959, the English chemist and novelist C.P. Snow published an 
essay claiming that contemporary society had become divided into two 
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distinct cultures: The Sciences and The Humanities.6 While the former is 
concerned with an objective understanding of natural phenomena, the latter 
is especially interested in the effects, artifacts, and creations of people.  
Snow’s contention is that in earlier times an intellectual was expected to be 
familiar with such subjects as History, Foreign Languages (including dead 
ones), as well as the Arts (particularly Music, Literature, and Painting).  In 
an earlier age, a person of culture was assumed to be familiar with the works 
of such figures as Herodotus, Shakespeare, Mozart, or Michelangelo.  Not 
being acquainted with such names and their accomplishments signified a 
lack of education, a need for refinement, and limited the social circles into 
which one might be admitted.  Apart from such rare figures as Da Vinci or 
Goethe, those steeped in the humanities had little acquaintance with the 
principles of science, and little reason to gain such acquaintance.  To the 
detriment of everyone, according to Snow, science was neither understood 
nor respected by the dominant culture of the age. 
 In more recent times, of course, the tables have turned: what matters 
today is that a well-educated person comprehend the basic principles that 
govern the natural world.  In the present age, a well-informed person is 
expected to have an understanding of Mathematics, Physics, Chemistry, and 
Biology.  Being unaware of The Periodic Table, The Laws of 
Thermodynamics, or The Theory of Natural Selection constitutes a definite 
gap in a person’s education (while familiarity with such historical figures as 
Boyle, Newton, or Darwin is nice, but far less essential than understanding 
the ideas they contributed to each field).  The focus now is less on whom you 
know than on what you know, with personal details falling by the way in 
favor of ever more universal laws and principles.  With computer servers that 
are now able to store particular facts on billions of people (and which can be 
retrieved at a moment’s notice), trying to personally memorize them all 
seems a misuse of one’s own time and carrying capacity.  Given the rate at 
which knowledge has accumulated over the past few centuries, it’s more than 
enough if one can cram just the most essential aspects of the natural sciences 
into a single skull.  If there is ever any spare time, of course, each of us 
would love to learn to play an instrument, try our hand at painting, or finally 
write the novel that has been brewing inside of us all along.  But life, sadly, 
is short, and it requires that we make choices – choices of both theoretical 
and practical import, about what matters most to us in life, about which 
course of action seems most promising at the time, which will ultimately 
lead to the person each of us will become. 
                                          
6 C.P. Snow’s “Two Cultures” (Snow, The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution, 
1959). 
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 As a result, we live in a world divided roughly in two, in which the 
cultures of the sciences and humanities are separated, often ignorant of one 
another, and occasionally even antagonistic.  Those in the humanities often 
feel that science is too reductionistic, heartless or unfeeling, lacking the 
human characteristics that make life most worth living.  Those in the 
sciences, by contrast, often think of the humanities as “soft,” more a matter 
of childlike play than serious work or study, and even demean the so-called 
“social sciences” for not being genuine or “real”.  According to Snow, this 
divide impoverishes both sides (in much the same way that someone today 
might consider people impoverished who are only able use the right or left 
side of their brain), leaving us unwilling to acknowledge the value contained 
in the very opposition between the two.  Mingling with both cultures (as a 
scientist as well as a novelist), he recounts his own experiences of the rift 
between them, noting that while either side may be ignorant or derisive, 
because of the effects that not knowing about science can have on a person’s 
life, there is a special onus on the humanities to learn about what the sciences 
have discovered.  In Snow’s words: 
A good many times I have been present at gatherings of people who, 
by the standards of the traditional culture, are thought highly 
educated and who have with considerable gusto been expressing their 
incredulity at the illiteracy of scientists. Once or twice I have been 
provoked and have asked the company how many of them could 
describe the Second Law of Thermodynamics.  The response was 
cold: it was also negative. Yet I was asking something which is the 
scientific equivalent of: Have you read a work of Shakespeare’s? 
 For some people, not having read Romeo and Juliet is like not having 
experienced a first love of one’s own: you are ignorant of something 
essential about the human condition.  Part of Snow’s contention is that those 
who deride science are ignorant of everything that causes the human 
condition in the first place, including how The Second Law ensures that all 
lovers stars are bound to cross, that no one’s love - however sincere - can 
possibly last forever (not only is that tragic, but you can bet on it)!  But 
another, more significant, part of Snow’s contention is that what appears to 
be a merely academic matter has important real-world consequences: that the 
division between these two cultures is exacerbating the economic split 
between the haves and the have-nots.  Long before anyone understood the 
details behind a parent’s desire to have their child study law or medicine, 
people have known that (by and large) what you know equates with how 
well do in life.  Indeed, history contains very few instances of parents 
begging their children to become poets or (now) lead guitarists.  And 
because we live in an ever more technological age, understanding the details 
of human physiology, astronomy, or robotics (for example) is much more 
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likely to increase one’s bottom line than a life in the theatre, on stage, or in 
the studio.  And while the arts and humanities may be more personally 
rewarding for some, Snow’s point is about the collective impact of such 
inequity.  For it’s not just the ability to earn money which divides the haves 
from the have-nots; it’s all of the things that money can buy, such as 
healthcare, decent housing, or better food (in some cases, any food at all), as 
well as access to the very education which makes it possible to earn a living 
(and all of these other things) in the first place.  Add to that the psychological 
well-being that comes from believing that tomorrow might be better than 
today – because you can now provide food and shelter for your family – and 
it’s little wonder that anyone enters the humanities at all. 
 But why should people who are relatively affluent care about any of 
that?  And even if we do, isn’t it just a matter of redistributing wealth, of 
reallocating resources in order to feed the hungry and alleviate poverty?  Not 
according to Snow – his contention is that this split between the sciences and 
humanities has not only increased the divide between rich and poor, but that 
the divide between rich and poor has in turn become a major hindrance to 
solving the world's most pressing problems (problems which have only 
grown more pressing in the half century since the time of Snow’s essay).  
For among the issues affected by this are increased concentrations of CO2, 
increased populations of Homo sapiens, the depletion of rainforests and non-
renewable resources, as well as a severe loss of biodiversity.  Poverty, it 
would appear, is not just a poor person’s problem anymore, but one that 
negatively affects everyone in the world.  And because the rift between the 
sciences and the humanities exacerbates the divide in income, the real-world 
problems increased by that poverty are problems which even academics have 
had a hand in.  For, by isolating ourselves from one another, we academics 
have inadvertently added not only to the increasing gap between rich and 
poor, but to the practical problems from which education alone might save 
us.  Remaining hold up in ivory towers not only does not exempt us from 
responsibility for these problems, but increases the amount we contribute to 
them (thereby insuring that they continue to grow).  Yet, because these 
problems require both cooperation and education, they are also problems we 
academics can arguably do something about. 
 Knowing we have a problem, though – even knowing that we can do 
something about it – isn’t enough to compel us to actually do it.  That is, 
knowledge alone appears insufficient to motivate action – at least, that’s the 
line held by the philosopher, historian, and economist David Hume.  His 
famous dictum – that “reason is and ought only to be, the slave of the 
passions"7 – was meant to overturn the traditional notion that knowledge is 
                                          
7 David Hume, Treatise on Human Nature, (2.3.3) p. 415. 
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necessary in order for action to be something other than a species of event.  
By asserting that what he called “the passions” are the motivating force 
behind human behavior, Hume restored emotion to the place of pride it had 
enjoyed before Plato’s take-over of the mind as purely rational.  To Hume’s 
way of thinking, our passions compel us to act, and the mind (or reason) is 
charged with the job of figuring out how to do it.  As a precursor to the 
Darwinian conception of people as a species of animal whose emotions drive 
their behaviors, and whose neo-cortex determines the most effective means 
of achieving those ends, Hume showed us that simply knowing about the 
world doesn’t cause us to change it.  Rather, we have to care about the way 
things are – and want them to be different in some way – in order to be 
motivated to do something about them.  Hume was led to this insight by 
reading works that contained factual claims which at some point transitioned 
into statements about value.  As he puts it, 
In every system of morality which I have hitherto met with, I have 
always remarked that the author proceeds for some time in the 
ordinary way of reasoning…when of a sudden I am surprised to find, 
that instead of the usual copulation of propositions – is and is not – I 
meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought or ought 
not. 
 The question is: how does one get from “is” to “ought,” from “is not” 
to “ought not”?  Many ancient and medieval thinkers held either a religious 
or secular version of what came to be called the theory of natural law: the 
idea that what is the case ought to be the case (either because God willed it to 
be so – a form of deism or pantheism, or simply because the laws of nature 
can never be altered – a form of determinism or even nihilism).  Hume, 
though, was simply pointing out the difference between a matter of fact and a 
human value (the same kind of fact/value distinction we see between the 
sciences and humanities today).  In his own day, Hume was surrounded by 
discussions about whether matters of moral interest were decided by “the 
head” or “the heart,” about whether values were determined through rational 
calculation or by what was then referred to as the sentiments, passions, or 
humors.  Of course, if one takes the side of emotion or “the heart,” one 
seems committed to a form of ethical hedonism: the notion that we each act 
for the sake of our own welfare, and expect others to do the same.  But if 
we’re only moved to help ourselves, knowing how things are for others – 
that we are “the haves,” and they “the have-nots,” for example – won’t 
motivate us to make a difference in their welfare.  Fortunately, however, we 
live in the same world, so that my self-interest compels me to improve the 
same world that you live in, compels “the haves” to improve the world of 
“the have-nots” if only to make a better world for themselves.  Building 
enclaves for the rich may appear to be a good short-term solution, but since 
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we can’t make air and water pollution stay in one place, or concentrate 
greenhouse gases only in someone else’s atmosphere, we may end up 
helping each other in order to get the world we want for ourselves – along 
with nicer, healthier, and more cooperative neighbors who feel the same way 
about their world. 
 In order to ensure cooperation, though, we have to do what we can to 
see that we and our neighbors are on the same page, that we look at things 
the same way and have the same priorities.  We know we share the same 
biology, but we can differ when it comes to ideology: the poor have needs 
that for the rich are already satisfied, the religious have dreams which secular 
society claims not to share, and various ethnic groups view themselves as 
either oppressed or chosen (and so, feel either disgruntled or entitled).  So, 
while the motivation to improve the world is shared by everyone, our 
understanding of its problems – how they are produced and how they can be 
remedied – differs from one group to another.  But here in the 21st century, 
we are fortunate to have at our disposal the means of addressing these 
differences, of educating ourselves about the nature of the world and 
communicating that understanding with others – and so, of getting everyone 
on the same ideological page (at least in terms of their own self-interest).   
For, over the past 500 years the methods of science have led not only to ever-
more astounding discoveries about the nature of the universe, but to ever 
greater cooperation among the people of Earth.  While we have been making 
agreements and forming alliances for as long as we’ve been able to 
communicate with one another, nothing has increased our ability to form 
consensus and establish social contracts better than the empirical methods of 
science.  Through these empirical processes, we have not only figured out 
the workings of a vast amount of non-human phenomena, but about how our 
own species fits in among all these things as well.  Having a better 
understanding of human needs and desires – as well as the various 
constraints on their satisfaction – enables us to formulate strategies to satisfy 
as many people as possible.  The application of science in our daily lives 
(including the lives of those in the humanities) allows us to solve both 
personal and communal problems, bringing collective thought to bear on 
problems any one of us may face as individuals. 
 However, while everyone has the ability to employ these methods, 
not everyone has access to the information necessary to do so.  For, the 
poverty which prevents people from gaining access to better food and 
healthcare also prevents them from getting the education necessary to 
appreciate the value of scientific methodology.  Ignorance of the methods of 
science prevents a person from understanding the true nature of their own 
situation (and so, from grasping why and when they should do something 
about it, as well as how the situation might best be handled).  But a general 
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ignorance of science also enables political leaders to manipulate public 
opinion, to misrepresent, obscure, or even eliminate data which run counter 
to their own agenda or evidence important to the public interest.  Though 
science is sometimes maligned as the domain of an elite few, in a very real 
sense science is the most egalitarian endeavor human beings have ever 
undertaken, opening a world of information to anyone willing and able to 
look at it.  The methods of science prevent political interests from dictating 
their own truth and hijacking public welfare, from putting the cart before the 
horse and causing us do things that run counter to our own best interests.  For 
that reason, denying people access to the education necessary for science is 
tantamount to denying them the right to think for themselves.  For, in order 
to evaluate claims about the world, and understand their implications for 
both themselves and society as a whole, they must be educated in disciplines 
essential to empirical inquiry.  The poverty which prevents people from 
gaining access to education prevents them not only from taking a more active 
role in their own lives, but from becoming part of the solution to the global 
problems which unite us all.  Perpetuating that poverty (even if 
unintentionally) is among the most inhumane things we do (not merely to 
them, but – because we have but one planet – to ourselves as well).  As 
intractable as some of these problems may be, we only make them more 
difficult by denying education to billions of minds which might be more 
gainfully employed. 
 In the meantime, some have suggested that we should have scientists 
govern the world, requiring that those in public office be not only our best 
and brightest, but be thoroughly trained in the ways of science as well, 
thereby enabling those who know most about the condition of things to 
determine what would be best for us all.  This kind of top-down approach, 
clearly defended by well-intentioned theorists since Plato, has its merits: it 
places government in the hands of those who understand best how nature 
operates, what kinds of things are most and least likely to occur, and which 
options would serve the state’s best long-term interests.  While individual 
citizens might be hoodwinked by the manipulative rhetoric of politicians, the 
country as a whole would be protected from those who seek to pass partisan 
opinions off as factual information.  However, forming what one might call a 
“Scientocracy” – in which scientists establish public policy – has its down 
sides as well: for such a government would sacrifice the will of the people to 
the better judgment of those who know most about established methods, 
generating a paternalism which could deprive those with less understanding 
from doing as they please.  While the system as a whole might run smoothly 
and efficiently, in order to ensure the protection of the state, the freedom of 
individuals wanting to deviate from established norms might have to be too 
tightly restricted.  Though curtailing individual liberty for the sake of group 
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cohesion is sometimes necessary, a state that too closely restricts its 
members not only limits what Mahatma Gandhi called “the freedom to err,” 
but threatens the very openness of inquiry essential to science itself.8  Such a 
“scientocracy,” in other words, might even prove fatal to science (by 
constraining imaginative efforts to reconceptualize what is already 
understood and discouraging research into barely articulable ideas someone 
may have for as yet unexplained reasons). 
 By contrast, one of the most commendable features of a democratic 
state is its constant barrage of new ideas, creating the variation of thought 
necessary to the process of cultural selection.  While many hypotheses will 
be weeded out as ineffective, the exchange of ideas itself often leads to new 
insights which might otherwise never have occurred to anyone.  The freedom 
of thought engendered by a democratic state and the openness of scientific 
inquiry are not only naturally compatible, they are the same thing: a contest 
of hypotheses about which ways of behaving will work best for a specific 
purpose.   Of course, not all hypotheses pan out, and those that don’t are 
discarded in favor of more promising alternatives.  We stick with what works 
best until someone suggests an option more effective for achieving that 
purpose.  But how are we to know which purposes to pursue?  Which goals 
to place before ourselves?  Which hopes to realize?  A democratic system of 
government can seem too open-ended, too liable to hijack by the whims of 
disparate trends.  If people are free to speak their minds on any and every 
subject, who’s to say what we should teach our children?  Which things 
should they be required to learn, and which should they be denied?  And 
why?  Should classes in the arts and humanities be taken seriously, or 
dropped in favor of an all-math-and-science curriculum?  Should states fund 
only those courses which will guarantee a uniformity of understanding (what 
I described earlier as “being on the same page”)?  Should our children seek 
conformity or novelty?  Uniformity or individuality?  Should we encourage 
them to chase the acceptance of others or to follow their own dreams? 
 According to Snow, “there is only one way out of all this: it is,” he 
says, “by rethinking our education.”9  Snow suggests that the questions I 
have been asking are themselves a product of these divided cultures, and that 
the dichotomies I have presented here are false.  For they presuppose that 
one culture is necessary and the other simply optional, that one deals in 
unimaginative discovery while the other is occupied with mindless invention.  
But scientists lack creativity no more than their artistic cousins, and those in 
the humanities are no less physically engaged than their scientific 
                                          
8 “Freedom is not worth having if it does not include the freedom to make mistakes.” - 
Mahatma Gandhi. 
9 Snow, op. cit., p.19. 
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counterparts.  We may take sides in academic debates, but none of us wants 
to choose between reality and imagination, between invention and discovery, 
because none of us truly believe that imagination is not part of the real 
world, that picturing something that has never actually happened is not part 
of what has led to some of the greatest scientific breakthroughs in human 
history.  It’s not just that we often have our “Eureka! moments” while 
singing in the shower, but that they are often generated through analogy and 
metaphor, by mixing descriptions of one topic with that of another, by 
combining things in ways that haven’t been tried before (ways which would 
not have been tried still had the person not been exposed to a variety of 
topics, disciplines, and subjects).  It’s not only travel that broadens the mind, 
but gaining entry into the thoughts and feelings of others, whether expressed 
in paint and marble, poetry and song, or theatre and dance.  In the humanities 
we find not only expressions of our commonality, but individual 
circumstances we might never otherwise encounter, from different places 
and times, all of which become part of our own experience, providing us 
with a broader palate for our own expression, thereby increasing the 
likelihood of our yelling “Eureka!” at any given moment.  Thinking of the 
humanities as expressing not only the breadth of human experience, but the 
analogical thinking in science itself is one way of getting at what Snow 
means by a rethinking of our education.  As he says, 
All the lessons of our educational history suggest [that] we are only 
capable of increasing specialization, not decreasing it.  Somehow we 
have set ourselves the task of producing a tiny elite…educated in one 
academic skill.10 
 Life, as I mentioned before, is sadly short, and yet the wealth of 
information in every field only increases with each passing day.  What’s a 
person to do?  You can’t know everything.  Increased specialization is 
necessary when dealing with complex phenomena, even commendable given 
what it enables certain individuals to accomplish in a specific area.  And yet, 
it’s a mistake when it comes to the individual in general.  For, it prevents the 
person not just from experiencing all that life has to offer, but from learning 
about the purposes others consider important.  When we think about which 
means we should take to achieve some end, how are we to know which end 
we ought to pursue?  “This will most quickly get me to that – but how do I 
know that that’s where I ought to go?  What’s really needed?  What matters 
most to others?  What am I doing this for?”  Not everyone can fulfill their 
dream of singing with the opera, or dancing with the ballet, but all of us can 
study the arts and appreciate their beauty.  Only some of us go on to make 
discoveries in physics, chemistry, or biology, but we can all be amateurs of 
                                          
10 Snow, op. cit., pp.51 & 53. 
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the sciences, learning how integral they are to the lives of everyone on Earth.  
What appears to be lacking on both sides of the divide is an appreciation of 
what the other culture has to offer, of the role each already plays in the 
formation of the other.  As the educator John Dewey once said, 
Pupils learn a ‘science’ instead of learning the scientific way of 
treating the familiar material of ordinary experience…Since the mass 
of pupils are never going to become scientific specialists, it is much 
more important that they should get some insight into what scientific 
method means.11 
 Dewey’s point is that, because all of our interactions are empirical, 
even if someone is not going to become a professional scientist, they will 
still benefit from learning about the methods of science, since those methods 
can be employed in every aspect of their own life.  In the same way, even if 
someone is not going to become a writer, actor, or painter, they will still 
benefit from learning about the humanities, since these express the multitude 
of ends which others have pursued and provide examples of ends to which 
we ourselves might aspire.  While our common humanity may suggest ends 
we might pursue, it is our common empiricism which provides us with the 
means, making the divide between the sciences and humanities as illusory as 
that between the head and the heart: as if one could do without either.  
Instead of a divide between factual objectivity and individual subjects, what 
Dewey is contending is that… 
Knowledge is humanistic in quality not because it is about human 
products,  …but because of what it does in liberating human 
intelligence and human sympathy.12 
 Whether we think of ourselves as belonging to one culture or another, 
we can always benefit from our differences in perspective.  If we give our 
allegiance to the discoveries of science, we shouldn’t lose sight of the 
imaginative element in each of us so well fostered by the humanities.  And if 
we throw in our lot with inventiveness of the humanities, we should not 
forget that science is the very process through which we bring those most 
human ideas to life.  For, the sciences and humanities are never permanently 
divided, never any further apart than creativity and hard work, foresight and 
logic, dreams and the recognition of obstacles to their realization.  Rather, 
the sciences and humanities permeate one another - like “mind and body,” 
emotion and reason, left brain and right, or male and female, they constitute 
parts of what in reality is a much more interesting whole.  And if we are to 
keep the horse before the cart, and drive the common lot of humanity 
                                          
11 John Dewey, Democracy and Education, pp.220-1. 
12 Dewey, op. cit., p.230. 
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forward, we will have to ensure not only their consensual integration, but 
that everyone on earth has access to them all. 
 
References: 
Dewey, John, Democracy and Education, The Free Press, 1916. 
Hume, David, Treatise on Human Nature (1739), Clarendon Press, 1989. 
Snow, C.P., The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution (1959), 
Cambridge University Press, 2012. 
 
 
 
  
